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Abstract
We study the corporate governance of rms in environments where possibly
heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A rm,
formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a
contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for better management
control, but makes it hard for managers to react quickly when market conditions
change. Codes tend to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in environments
where managers obtain low levels of benets. The rms with the best projects tend
to adopt a Code when managers are not too heterogeneous, while the best managers
tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although
the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative,
shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce hiring the best
managers; instead, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers.
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1 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the creation and di¤usion of Codes of Best Practice
(or Codes of Corporate Governance) all around the world. A Code of Best Practice is a list
of rules promoted by a regulator suggesting how a rm should supervise management. A
Codes recommendations cover a wide range of corporate governance issues: for example,
board structure, executive compensation, and the role played by institutional investors
and capital structure (Becht et al., 2002). Yet, the two most relevant features shared by
any Code of Best Practice are, rst, its voluntary nature1 and, second, its purpose to
improve management oversight.2
In this paper, we analyze the implementation of Codes in markets where possibly het-
erogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers.3 We study which
rms use Codes and how this depends on the characteristics of the set of shareholders and
managers, as well as each rms output market. We model each rm as an agency relation-
ship (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), where each shareholder hires one manager to conduct
her project. A shareholder can hire a manager either through an incentive contract or
through a contract that includes a Code of Best Practice. The success of each project
depends on the decisions taken by the manager and also on product market conditions.
Both the shareholder and manager know the (ex-ante) distribution of the market condi-
tions parameter; however, only the manager learns the actual realization of the market
conditions once the contract has been signed.
The adoption of the Code is a mechanism that allows the shareholder to reduce the
1In some countries, the legislation requires rms either to comply with each rule or to explain why
they do not comply (comply or explainprinciple).
2The introduction of Codes of Best Practice was instigated by the Cadbury Report (1992). See, for
instance, Aguilera et al. (2004) for the number and di¤usion of Codes of Best Practice. See also IOSCO
(2006) for a recent survey of compliance with Board Independence rules proposed by OECD (2004), which
can be considered the standard for Codes of Best Practice.
3We analyze contracts for top executive managers. We have in mind managers whose decisions strongly
inuence the rmsprots. In most cases, only CEOs (Chief Executive o¢ cers) have such a power.
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managers discretion (see, for instance, Dahya et al., 2002). However, this improvement
in the boards control may be accompanied by a decrease in exibility at the level of
managers decisions, thus a¤ecting the rms competitiveness, as argued by Sir Owen
Green, former BTR Chairman:
There is danger in an over-emphasis on monitoring; on non-executive di-
rectorsindependence from the business of the corporation; on controls over
decision making activities of companies. When coupled with the clearly re-
duced status of executives on the governing boards, such requirements must
blunt the competitive edge and deect the entrepreneurial drive which char-
acterises participation, let alone success, in a free market.(Sir Owen Green,
Pall Mall Lecture on UK Corporate Governance, February 25,1994)
We model this trade-o¤ in a simple way: a managers payment depends on the nal
outcome if he is hired through an incentive contract while a Code allows the shareholder
to propose a contract specifying (ex-ante) the managers decisions. Thus, a shareholder
chooses between a contract that easily adjusts to the environment, but requires her to
provide incentives to the manager and a (Code) contract that allows her to reduce the
managers rents but imposes large costs if market conditions are extreme since no adjust-
ment is possible.
In the study of one isolated partnership, we show that a Code is more likely to be
adopted when projects are highly protable, managers are e¢ cient, have low exogenous
outside opportunities and there is a low variance in market conditions.
The main purpose of our paper is the analysis of the adoption of Codes in environ-
ments where shareholders compete for managers, so that the identities of the matched
partners and their levels of utility, in addition to the contract, are endogenous rather than
exogenous. For this purpose, we follow the approach adopted in papers such as Dam and
Pérez-Castrillo (2006), Legros and Newmann (2007) and Serfes (2008). We model a two-
sided market where the transaction involves a contract. We take stability as the solution
concept for this market. An outcome (i.e., a matching between shareholders and man-
agers and a set of contracts) is stable if it can not be blocked by a shareholder-manager
pair who would sign a more protable contract for both parties.4
4Stability and competitive equilibrium are very close concepts. For matching models where the parties
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The analysis of the shareholder-manager competitive market gives rise to several in-
teresting results. First, in environments where shareholders own projects with di¤erent
expected returns while all managers have the same ability to conduct them, Codes are
adopted by those shareholders with the best projects. Second, when the market is com-
posed of homogeneous shareholders and heterogeneous managers, the best managers are
hired through incentive contracts in such a way that the Code of Best Practice is only
implemented in the relationships involving lower-ability managers (contrary to the con-
clusion obtained in the analysis of an isolated relationship).
Third, when both sides consist of heterogeneous agents, we determine conditions under
which the matching is positively assortative: that is, shareholders with better projects hire
better managers. This is always the case when either all the contracts in a stable outcome
are based on incentives, or they all include Codes. Fourth, we identify situations where the
matching is not positively assortative due to the coexistence of both types of contract. A
shareholder with a good project may opt for a contract including a Code of Best Practice,
attracting a less e¢ cient manager when the more e¢ cient one is too expensivebecause
he is being hired in the market through an incentive contract. Finally, we discuss the
welfare e¤ects of introducing Codes of Best Practice. Albeit its voluntary nature, the use
of Codes is not always welfare enhancing. We nd that, in general, introducing Codes
tends to be welfare enhancing if the environment displays a low variance, while it decreases
welfare in environments with intermediate variance.
The literature dealing with Codes of Best Practice is still very scarce. With regard
to the theoretical literature, Alonso-Paulí (2007) models a Code as a mechanism that
prevents the manager from taking certain (bad) actions. He investigates the e¤ect of
its adoption on managers incentives and studies the design of the optimal Code by a
regulator. The empirical literature investigates the relation among corporate governance
provisions, the introduction of a Code, and rmsperformances. This analysis has not
reached a consensus in its conclusions. For instance, while Arcot and Bruno (2006),
Gompers et al. (2003) and Fernández and Gómez (2002) nd positive e¤ects of the
adoption of the Code in the US, the UK and Spain, respectively, whereas Nowak et al.
decide on money instead of contracts see, for instance, Shapley and Shubik (1972), Roth and Sotomayor
(1990) and Pérez-Castrillo and Sotomayor (2002). Any stable outcome is also a competitive equilibrium
and viceversa.
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(2004) and De Jong et al. (2006), nd no e¤ect of Codesrecommendations for Germany
and the Netherlands.
Our paper is in line with a long tradition of studies on corporate governance mech-
anisms, such as takeovers, large shareholders, boards of directors and managers com-
pensations to solve the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Regarding
the disciplinary role of the market, the inuential papers by Grossman and Hart (1980)
and Scharfstein (1988) study the main e¤ects of the threat of takeovers and establish
the takeover guidelines for this mechanism to be e¤ective. On the role played by large
shareholders, Admati et al. (1994) show that large shareholders tend to under-monitor
because they balance the benets of monitoring the manager against the costs of hav-
ing undiversied portfolios. On the contrary, over-monitoring may arise, for instance, if
shareholders enjoy private benets of control (La Porta et al., 1998). Hermalin and Weis-
bach (1998) and Adams and Ferreira (2007) have developed important contributions to
understanding the functioning of the board of directors. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)
analyze the process by which directors get selected and the inuence of the manager on
this process. Adams and Ferreira (2007) study the monitoring and the advising tasks
developed by any board of directors. Finally, the role played by an appropriately cho-
sen executive compensation scheme has been extensively studied (see, for instance, the
pioneering work by Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
In analyzing markets where agents from two sides match, Dam and Pérez-Castrillo
(2006) characterize a market with homogeneous principals and heterogeneous agents en-
joying limited liability, whereas Serfes (2008) studies a market with heterogeneous prin-
cipals and agents with CARA utility functions. Legros and Newmann (2007) provide
su¢ cient conditions for monotone matchings in environments where, as is the case in
our framework, utility is not fully transferable. Their generalized increasing di¤erences
property requires that the shareholders willingness to pay to attract a better manager
should increase with the value of her project, a property that does not hold when share-
holders have the possibility of introducing a Code. Finally, Besley and Ghatak (2005)
emphasize the virtues of mission-orientation and matching in a framework where the
agents care about the rm they are matched with.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the main features of
the model and the corresponding solution concept. The properties of the contract in
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stable outcomes are stated in Section 3. Section 4 studies particular manager-shareholder
markets and provides characteristics for the most general environment. The welfare e¤ect
of introducing Codes is discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and
discuses some extensions of the model. All proofs are included in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Shareholders and Managers
We consider the market for managers where n risk-neutral shareholders S = fs1; s2; s3; :::; sng
meet N risk neutral managersM = fm1;m2;m3; :::;mNg. We denote shareholders by s,
si, si0, etc. and, similarly, managers are represented by m, mj, mj0, etc. Each shareholder
owns a project but lacks the skills to develop it. Each manager has the ability to conduct
one project. Thus, shareholders and managers have to match up in pairs to carry out
projects and a contract is signed for each partnership. Managers enjoy limited liability
over income: their wage can not be negative under any conditions.
Both shareholders and managers may be heterogeneous agents. Shareholders may
di¤er in the protability of the projects they own while managers may diverge in their
ability to conduct shareholdersprojects. We allow for the possibility that both share-
holders and managers can seek alternative partners and sign new contracts. Hence, the
matching between shareholders and managers will be endogenous.
2.2 Projects
Once a shareholder-manager pair is formed, a rm is constituted and the manager is
in charge of making decisions concerning the project. We assume for simplicity that
projects are independent in the sense that, once constituted, a rms prots only depend
on decisions made in that rm. The project yields revenue Ri > 0 for shareholder si if
it is successful, whereas the asset has value 0 in case of failure. The values of Ri, for
i = 1; :::n; are public information. Without loss of generality, we order the projects as
R1  R2  :::  Rn > 0. The probability of success of the project depends on the
managers decision or e¤ort e and on the realization h of some random shock eh. In
particular, we assume that the probability of success is eh.
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The e¤ort of managermj is his own private information, and it has a cost cj(e) = cj e
2
2
,
with cj > 0. The managersabilities (the inverses of cj) are public information, and we
order the managers depending on their ability: 0 < c1  c2  :::  cN ; that is, a lower
index corresponds to a more e¢ cient manager.
The random variable eh represents the uncertainty in the output market of a project.
This industry-specic component can reect di¤erences among sectors, countries, etc.
It is common knowledge that the realization h is distributed according to F (h) on the
interval

h; h

and it is revealed only to the manager after he accepts the contract and
before he decides on the e¤ort. We denote by  =
Z h
h
hdF (h) the mean and by V ar =Z h
h
h2dF (h) 
"Z h
h
hdF (h)
#2
the variance of the random shock.
Given the objective functions of the participants in a rm, the First-Best level of
e¤ort corresponds to the optimal e¤ort for the joint shareholder/manager rm with the
objective function FBsi;mj(e; h) = heRi   cje
2
2
. Therefore, the optimal First-Best e¤ort is
contingent on the realization of the random shock eh:
eFBij (h) =
Rih
cj
.
Finally, since we assume that the probability of the projects success is given by eh, an
additional assumption is required to ensure that the condition eh  1 always holds. One
su¢ cient condition is
R1
c1
h
2  1:
Indeed, under this assumption eh  1 for the First-Best level of e¤ort decided by the best
possible partnership in the most favorable realization of eh. Hence, eh  1 will also hold
for the level of e¤ort associated to any contract signed in this market, since it will never
be higher than the First-Best level
We denote by fS;M;R; cg the market for managers and shareholders, where R 
(R1; R2; :::; Rn) denotes the vector of the shareholders projects and c  (c1; c2; :::; cn)
corresponds to the vector of the managersabilities.
2.3 Contracts and payo¤s
When shareholder si and manager mj form a rm, they sign a contract that will govern
their relationship. The contract can be based on an incentive scheme (IS contract) or it
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can include a Code of Best Practices (CBP contract).
An IS contract for the rm (si;mj) takes the form W ISsi;mj = (w
R
i;j; w
0
i;j). The rst
component wRi;j is the transfer to the manager in case revenue Ri is obtained; the second
part w0i;j is the transfer in case of failure, when the result is 0. Under contract (w
R
i;j; w
0
i;j),
the manager will select the e¤ort ei;j(wRi;j; w
0
i;j;h) once he has observed the realization h:
ei;j(w
R
i;j; w
0
i;j;h) = argmax
e
fw0i;j + he(wRi;j   w0i;j)  cj
e2
2
g,
which implies that the level of e¤ort is
ei;j(w
R
i;j; w
0
i;j;h) =
h
cj
(wRi;j   w0i;j). (ICC)
The previous equation represents the Incentive Compatibility Constraint (ICC). It states
that the manager exerts a higher level of e¤ort if the bonus is large (wRi;j   w0i;j), if the
market conditions are particularly protable (high h), or if he has good skills (low cj).
Alternatively, the rm (si;mj) can sign a CBP contract. A CBP is a monitoring
technology that allows the shareholder to gather better information about the managers
decisions. We model the adoption of a Code in a very simple way: the boards control
allows them to make the managers decisions ex-ante contractual, i.e., the shareholder
can ask the manager for any specic level of e¤ort. Although the managers decisions
are ex-ante contractible, the shareholders still do not know the realization of the market
conditions. Therefore, the agency problem between the manager and the shareholder is
not fully solved. A CBP contract for rm (si;mj) is then a vectorWCBPsi;mj = (w
R
i;j; w
0
i;j; ei;j)
that species the payments to the manager as well as the e¤ort he must exert.
Any contract must be acceptable to both the manager and the shareholder. Both agents
must be better o¤ signing the contract than staying apart from the market. Contract
Wsi;mj is acceptable to shareholder si if it o¤ers her non-negative prots. It is acceptable
to manager mj if his expected utility under Wsi;mj is not lower than the utility he would
obtain by exiting the market. We call this the outside utilityand denote it U . We write
the previous Acceptability constraints as follows:
si(mj;Wsi;mj)  0, (ACs)
Vmj(si;Wsi;mj)  U , (ACm)
where si(mj;Wsi;mj) is shareholder sis expected prots and Vmj(si;Wsi;mj) is manager
mjs expected utility when they sign the contract Wsi;mj .
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Furthermore, contracts have to satisfy managerslimited liability constraints:
wRi;j  0, (LLR)
w0i;j  0. (LL0)
Contracts that are not acceptable to one of the parties or that do not satisfy limited
liability constraints will be discarded. We say that they are not feasible contracts.
Denition 1 A contract Wsi;mj is feasible for (si;mj) if it satises the acceptability
and limited liability constraints (ACs), (ACm), (LLR), and (LL0).
2.4 Matching
We represent the identity of the partners forming rms through a matching function that
associates shareholders with managers. We now describe a matching in this economy.
Denition 2 A (one-to-one) matching for the market fS;M;R; cg is a mapping  :
S [M  ! S [M such that (i) (si) 2 M[ fsig for all si 2 S, (ii) (mj) 2 S [ fmjg
for all mj 2M, and (iii) (si) = mj if and only if (mj) = si for all (si;mj) 2 S M.
The rm (si;mj) is formed under the matching  if (si) = mj (or, analogously,
(mj) = si). The matching function also indicates when an agent (shareholder or man-
ager) is not involved in any rm: (si) = si or (mj) = mj.
In addition, we need to describe which contract governs any relationship. The only
constraint is that contracts within a rm must be feasible.
Denition 3 A menu of contracts W that is compatible with a matching  for the
market fS;M;R; cg is a vector of feasible contracts, one for each rm formed under .
A matching and a set of contracts determine an organization of the market that we
will refer to as an outcome.
Denition 4 An outcome (;W) for the market fS;M;R; cg is a matching  and a
menu of contracts W compatible with :
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The objective of our paper is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes in the share-
holders/managers market. To be an equilibrium, the outcome (;W) must be immune
to potential blocking from any shareholder-manager pair. This idea corresponds to the
concept of stability and states that it is not sensible to expect (;W) to be a (stable or
equilibrium) outcome of the market if there exists any shareholder-manager pair that can
form a rm by signing a feasible contract such that both the shareholder and the manager
are better-o¤ under the new deal compared to the initial situation (;W).
Denition 5 An outcome (;W) for the market fS;M;R; cg is stable if there does not
exist any pair (si;mj) and any contract W 0 feasible for (si;mj) such that si(mj;W
0) >
si((si);Wsi;(si)) and Vmj(si;W
0) > Vmj((mj);W(mj);mj).
Since contracts in a stable outcome are feasible, they are also individually rational.
3 Contracts in a stable outcome
In this section, we take a rst look at the characteristics of contracts signed in stable
outcomes of market fS;M;R; cg. The rst characteristic is that it is not possible for the
partners of any existing rm to sign an alternative contract that both nd better than the
current contract. That is, contracts in a stable outcome are Pareto optimal among those
feasible contracts that satisfy (in the case of incentive contracts) incentive constraints.
We refer to this notion as (constrained) Pareto Optimality:
Denition 6 A contract Wsi;mj for a rm (si;mj) is constrained Pareto optimal if
there is no other feasible contract W 0 for (si;mj) such that si(mj;W
0)  si(mj;Wsi;mj)
and Vmj(si;W
0)  Vmj(si;Wsi;mj); with at least one strict inequality.
Proposition 1 states the optimality property.
Proposition 1 All the contracts in a stable outcome for the market fS;M;R; cg are
constrained Pareto optimal.
The property of constrained Pareto optimality allows us to identify any contract in a
stable outcome once we know the identity of the partners (si;mj) and the utility obtained
10
by manager mj. Indeed, the contract is the one that maximizes shareholder sis expected
prots under the constraint that manager mj gets this utility level.
In the rest of the section, we characterize the best contract from the point of view
of shareholder sis as a function of any possible reservation utilitylevel U j that has to
be achieved by the manager. We denote such a contract as Wsi;mj(U j).
5 Note that the
level U j will be an equilibrium reservation utility level, inuenced by the possibility that
manager mj forms a partnership with other shareholders. We rst identify the contract if
(si;mj) sign an Incentive Scheme contractW ISsi;mj(U j) then, we calculate the best contract
including a CBP WCBPsi;mj (U j). Finally, as a function of the reservation utility U j, we state
which type of contract is chosen.
The impact of limited liability on IS contracts and on payo¤s is a function of the
level of managers utility level U j. For low values of U j, the optimal payment scheme
depends only on the value of the project Ri. The shareholder shares half of the value in
case of success and the manager ends up with a utility larger than U j. For large values
of U j, the optimal payment scheme is also a¤ected by U j as this is the utility level that
must be provided to the manager. The threshold, denoted by bUij, that divides both
regions depends on the value of the project and on the distribution of the market specic
component as well as on the e¢ ciency of the manager. Formally,
bUij = R2i
cj
[V ar + 2]
8
:
Finally, note that shareholder si will not nd a contract with managermj acceptable if she
obtains negative prots. This situation arises for U j > eUij  R2icj [V ar+2]2 . We summarize
these ndings and identify the contract W ISsi;mj(U j) in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 If (si;mj) sign an IS contract W ISsi;mj(U j) in a stable outcome for the
market fS;M;R; cg, then:
(a) U j  eUij and the managers expected utility is Uj = maxnbUij; U jo ;
(b) the transfers under W ISsi;mj(U j) are w
0
i;j = 0 and w
R
i;j =
q
2cjUj
[V ar+2]
;
5As we will see, the optimal IS contract when shareholder si has to ensure manager mj at least U j
may provide him a level of utility higher than U j (due to the limited liability constraint). That is, U j
might not be the managers actual utility. However, we compute the optimal shareholders contract for
any possible U j as it is the most direct way to proceed in our analysis.
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(c) the managers e¤ort as a function of h is eISi;j (h) = h
q
2Uj
cj [V ar+2]
;
(d) the shareholders expected prots are si(W
IS
si;mj
(U j)) = Ri
q
2[V ar+2]Uj
cj
  2Uj:
Figure 1 depicts shareholder sis prots as a function of manager mjs reservation
utility U j. For any U j in the interval
h
0; bUij, the optimal contract is the same. It
provides the manager an expected utility level of bUij; which is larger than the minimum
utility U j. Since the manager is protected by limited liability, his salary in case of failure
can not be lower than zero. Providing incentives for e¤ort requires paying a bonus to
the manager in case of success. The optimal bonus from the shareholders perspective
ensures the manager a utility level of bUij; which is higher than U j when the latter is low.
When U j 2
hbUij; eUiji ; the e¢ ciency of the (contingent) managers e¤ort increases with
U j; it goes from e
IS
ij (h) = e
FB
ij (h)=2 when U j = bUij to eISij (h) = eFBij (h) when U j = eUij:
Indeed, the shareholder provides the required higher utility by increasing the salary in
case of success (and keeping w0i;j = 0). Intuitively, the prots increase with the value of
the project Ri and with the managers e¢ ciency (the inverse of cj).
Finally, market conditions, as measured by the variance and the mean of the distribu-
tion of eh, have a crucial impact on shareholders prots under an IS contract. As expected,
a larger mean implies larger shareholders prots; a larger variance, maybe more surpris-
ingly, also leads to larger prots. To give an intuition on the latter e¤ect, note that both
shareholder and manager are risk-neutral agents and this would suggest that variance has
no e¤ect on prots. This would happen if e¤ort would be independent of the realization
of the market conditions. However, the manager adjusts e to the realization h. Given
the complementarity between e¤ort and market conditions (since the probability of the
projects success is given by eh), an increase in h leads the manager to also increase e.
Therefore, the prot function is a convex function of h and, under the optimal contract,
prots are increasing with the variance.
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Figure 1: Shareholders prots under Incentive
contracts
Since the e¤ort is contractible under a CBP contract and both participants are risk-
neutral, the only role played by the payment scheme in WCBPsi;mj (U j) is to compensate the
manager. Therefore, a xed payment is always optimal.6 Proposition 3 summarizes the
characteristics of the contract when the Code is adopted:
Proposition 3 If (si;mj) sign a CBP contract in a stable outcome for the market fS;M;R; cg,
then the following WCBPsi;mj (U j) is an optimal contract:
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(a) the managers e¤ort under WCBPsi;mj (U j) is e
CBP
i;j =
Ri
cj
;
(b) the transfers are wRi;j = w
0
i;j = U j +
R2i
cj
2
2
;
(c) U j  R
2
i
cj
2
2
and the manager obtains a utility of U j;
(d) the shareholders expected prots are si(W
CBP
si;mj
(U j)) =
R2i
cj
2
2
  U j:
6In some rms, the monitoring technology may be more powerful than the one suggested by our model,
allowing the shareholder not only to verify whether the contractual e¤ort (or decision) is provided but
also to check whether the manager provides an e¤ort level at least as high as the contractual e¤ort (or
a decision at least as benecial as the contractual decision). Then, a variable payment scheme together
with the contractual e¤ort would be better than a xed payment: it would induce the manager to provide
a higher e¤ort in case of excellent market conditions. We exclude this possibility for simplicity and to
highlight the loss of exibility incurred by adopting the Code.
7The risk-neutrality of shareholders and managers implies that any pair fwRi;j ; w0i;jg  (0; 0); such that
w0i;j + e
CBP
i;j (w
R
i;j   w0i;j) 
1
2
cj(e
CBP
i;j )
2 = U j ;
where eCBPi;j =
Ri
cj
, is also an optimal contract.
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The optimal ex-ante level of e¤ort that maximizes the shareholders prots depends
on the value of the project Ri, the managers e¢ ciency (the inverse of cj) and also on ,
the average value of the market conditions. Since the managers e¤ort must be selected
ex-ante and the shareholder does not know the true market conditions, the optimal level
of e¤ort is taken as if the true realization were in fact the mean of the distribution; this
is the choice that minimizes the potential losses from an ex-post deviation from eFBij (h).
Once we have studied the characteristics of W ISsi;mj(U j) and W
CBP
si;mj
(U j), we proceed to
analyze whether shareholder si prefers to propose an IS contract or a CBP contract as a
function of U j and the distribution of the market conditions. To this end, we capture the
market conditions by the Sharpe ratio. It states how good the ex-ante market conditions
are after the market volatility is taken into account. This ratio, also known as the reward-
to-variability index, has been extensively used to study the excess of return per unit of risk
in an investment strategy or a trading strategy.8 In what follows, we dene the Sharpe
ratio of the distribution F (h) as
Sr =
p
V ar
:
Proposition 4 characterizes the optimal contract.9
Proposition 4 Shareholder si obtains higher prots with the contract WCBPsi;mj (U j) than
with W ISsi;mj(U j) if and only if Sr > 1 and U j < U

ij, where
Uij  R
2
i
cj
hp
[V ar+2] pV ar
i2
2
if Sr  p3; and
Uij  R
2
i
2cj
h
2 V ar
2
i
if Sr 2 (1;p3).
Proposition 4 states the conditions for the optimal contract to include a Code of
Best Practice. Adopting a CBP requires, given a xed mean of the market conditions,
su¢ ciently low variance in the environment (Sr > 1) and a su¢ ciently low managers
utility level (U j < U

ij).
10 Under the CBP contract, the shareholder fully internalizes
8For a more detailed analysis of the Sharpe ratio, see Sharpe (1994).
9We adopt the convention that the IS contract will be selected in case of indi¤erence.
10In line with our results, Inderst et al. (2005) and Dow and Raposo (2005), among others, study
the optimal IS contract and show that the intensity of the incentives should increase with the market
volatility. Prendergast (2002) also points out that, contrary to the traditional analysis of the agency
model and based on the inconclusive empirical work, incentive schemes are more prone to be adopted
under volatile environments. Depending on the environment faced by the rms, managerss payments
may be dependent on input (e¤ort) rather than on output (i.e., revenues).
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the managers costs by providing him the constant utility U j and solving the problem
max
e
feRi  cj e22  U jg. If the variance of eh is low, the shareholders problem, and hence,
the managers e¤ort and the shareholders prots with the CBP contract are similar to
those of the joint rm, i.e., they are close to the First-Best. Under the IS contract, the
shareholder decides the bonus (wRi;j   w0i;j) and the e¤ort is chosen by the manager as a
solution to max
e
fw0i;j+he(wRi;j w0i;j) cj e
2
2
g. If the managers utility U j is low, the share-
holder only needs to provide a low bonus for the manager to accept the contract; hence
the managers choice of e¤ort will be much lower than the First-Best choice. Therefore,
the CBP contract dominates the IS one when both the variance of eh and the managers
utility U j are low. Otherwise, it is better to let the manager adjust the e¤ort by properly
choosing the payment scheme. Figure 2 illustrates the e¤ect of the managers utility on
the adoption decision when the environment is not too volatile.
Figure 2: Adoption decision under good market
conditions (Sr  p3)
The adoption of a CBP also depends on the ratio Ri=cj, that is, on the value of the
project and on the managers e¢ ciency. The higher this ratio, the higher the e¤ort that
will be asked from the manager; given the more acute agency problem, the shareholder si
nds the CBP more appealing.
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4 Stable outcomes in the shareholder-manager mar-
ket
In this section, we analyze stable outcomes in this market. The main objectives are to
highlight the e¤ect of competition for managers on the contracts signed by rms and to
identify the composition of the rms: who is matched with whom. First, we deal with
the cases where all the agents on one of the two sides are homogeneous, i.e., either all
the shareholders hold the same type of project or all the managers are equally e¢ cient.
We then provide properties of the stable outcomes in environments where both sides of
the market are formed by heterogeneous agents. The existence of stable outcomes in
our economy is well established by previous studies (see Kaneko, 1982).11 Remark 1
summarizes the existence of stable outcomes.
Remark 1 The set of stable outcomes in the market fS;M;R; cg is always non-empty.
4.1 Homogeneous shareholders and heterogeneous managers
Consider the case where the projects in the hands of all the shareholders o¤er identical
returns, i.e., Ri = R for all i = 1; :::; n while the managers di¤er in their abilities, c1 <
c2 < ::: < cN . Denote by mN the least e¢ cient manager with whom a shareholder makes
non-negative prots (if there are less e¢ cient managers in the market, we can discard
them, as they will never be matched in a stable outcome).
Proposition 5 characterizes the stable outcomes in such a market. In the proposition,
we denote by ~n = min fn;Ng the number of rms that will be formed. We also introduce
the following notation: if Sr > 1; we denote by j = s
 
Ws;mj(U

j )

the level of prots
that the shareholder obtains when manager mjs utility is such that she is indi¤erent
between a CBP contract and an IS contract.12 We note that j =
R2
4cj
[V ar + 2] if
Sr 2 (1;p3) and j = R
2
cj
[
p
V ar(V ar + 2)   V ar] if Sr  p3. The level j decreases
with cj (the inverse of managers e¢ ciency); hence it is also decreasing in j.
11Indeed, Kaneko (1982) generalizes the assignment game proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1972) and
proves the non-emptiness of the core of this generalized version (see also Crawford and Knoer, 1981).
12For notational convenience, we denote Uj instead of U

ij , since the shareholders are homogeneous.
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Proposition 5 When the shareholders are homogeneous and the managers are heteroge-
neous, properties (a) - (d) characterize an stable outcome (;W) for the market fS;M;R; cg:
(a) all shareholders have the same prot level ;
(b)  = 0 if n > N ;   s (Ws;mN (U)) if n = N ; and  2

s
 
Ws;mn+1(U)

; s (Ws;mn(U))

if n < N ;
(c) Ws;mj is the optimal contract for mj that gives prots  to the shareholder.
In particular,
(d1) all the contracts are IS contracts if Sr  1 or if Sr > 1 and   ~n;
(d2) all the contracts are CBP contracts if Sr > 1 and  > 1;
(d3) Ws;mj is a CBP contract if j > J and Ws;mj is an IS contract if j  J , when Sr > 1
and J is such that J   > J+1.
As Proposition 5 states, the set of stables outcomes is typically not a singleton when
 > 0: If n = N , then a stable outcome is associated to each   s (Ws;mN (U)); hence,
the set of stables outcomes is a singleton only when s (Ws;mN (U)) = 0. Similarly, if
n < N the set of stables outcomes is a singleton only when cn = cn+1, in which case
s
 
Ws;mn+1(U)

= s (Ws;mn(U)). Otherwise, a stable outcome can be associated to each
 in the interval.
We now explain the intuitions behind Proposition 5. Since all the shareholders hold
projects with the same returns, their prots in stable outcomes must be equal. If this
were not the case, shareholder si obtaining lower prots than si0 could attract manager
(si0) by proposing a contract that slightly increases his utility. Second, the level of prots
depends on the strength of the competition for managers. Shareholders achieve positive
prots when the competition for managers is smooth, that is, they are in the short side
of the market. Furthermore, their prots are higher when there are very good unmatched
managers. Third, in case (d1), all stable contracts are IS contracts if the ex-ante market
conditions are not good enough, i.e., Sr  1. Also, if Sr > 1, all the contracts are still
IS contracts when even the manager with the lowest ability among those matched, m~n,
signs an IS contract. This may happen because either the shareholders are the long side
of the market so that their equilibrium prots are zero, or the managersoutside utility U
is high, or the level of ability of m~n is low. Fourth, similarly, all stable contracts include a
CBP if even the most e¢ cient manager is o¤ered a Code, which corresponds to markets
with good ex-ante conditions (Sr > 1) and where the shareholdersprots are high (case
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(d2)).
Finally, Proposition 5 (d3) describes the situations where IS and CBP contracts co-
exist: e¢ cient managers end up being hired through IS contracts, while a CBP is used
to attract ine¢ cient ones. This contrasts with the conclusion obtained after Proposi-
tion 4, suggesting that a CBP would be adopted for e¢ cient managers. When share-
holders compete for the best managers, the conclusion is reversed. To attract e¢ cient
managers, shareholders o¤er them a high utility level and this now makes IS contracts
more appealing than CBP contracts. This result stresses the relevance of the study of
manager-shareholder relationships in a framework where not only the contracts but also
the matching is endogenous.13
4.2 Heterogeneous shareholders and homogeneous managers
We now consider an economy formed by heterogeneous shareholders (Ri > Ri0 for all
i < i0) and equally e¢ cient managers (cj = c for all mj 2 M). We denote by sn the
shareholder endowed with the least protable project that ensures non-negative prots;
hence, ~n = MinfN; ng rms will be formed at a stable outcome. Proposition 6 charac-
terizes the stable outcomes for this market (we denote Ui instead of U

ij).
Proposition 6 When the shareholders are heterogeneous and the managers are homoge-
neous, then any stable outcome (;W) for the market fS;M;R; cg is characterized by
(a) a level U o that satises: U o = U if ~n < N , U o 2
heU~n+1;m; eU~n;mi if ~n = N < n, and
U o 2
h
U; eU~n;mi if ~n = N = n
(b) all the contracts are Wsi;m = Wsi;m(U
o);
In particular,
(c1) all the contracts are IS contracts if Sr  1 or if Sr > 1 and U o  U1 ;
(c2) all the contracts are CBP contracts if Sr > 1 and U o < U~n;
(c3) Wsi;m is a CBP contract if i  I and Wsi;m is an IS contract if i > I if Sr > 1 and
UI+1  U o < UI .
13As in the works of Barros and Macho-Stadler (1998) and Dam and Pérez-Castrillo (2006), the use of
incentive contracts has also a positive e¤ect on the rms e¢ ciency. The better the manager, the closer
the e¤ort to its First-Best level.
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Any stable outcome is characterized in part (b) of Proposition 6, once we know the
managersopportunity cost, as classied in part (a). A managers opportunity cost is U if
there are many managers. However, it is larger if there are at least as many shareholders
as managers, for example because a manager has the possibility to build a rm with an
unmatched shareholder. As happened in Proposition 5, the set of stables outcomes is
typically not a singleton when U o > U . Indeed, a stable outcome is associated to each
U o 2
heU~n+1;m; eU~n;mi if ~n = N < n, or U o 2 hU; eU~n;mi if ~n = N = n.
The proposition describes three di¤erent cases. Case (c1) identies environments
where the stable outcomes only involve IS contracts. This situation takes place in volatile
markets or when the managersopportunity cost is very high. Case (c2) considers environ-
ments with low variance and low cost for hiring managers, where all the contracts include
a CBP. Case (c3) characterizes the circumstances under which both types of contracts
coexist. The adoption decision in this framework is similar to the case of an isolated rm:
shareholders who have good projects prefer to adopt a CBP, saving on incentive costs.
4.3 Heterogeneous shareholders and heterogeneous managers
We now analyze markets where both the shareholders and the managers are heterogeneous.
The main question is whether shareholders with good projects end up hiring e¢ cient
managers. If this is a characteristic of the matching, we say it is positively assortative.
Denition 7 A matching  for the market fS;M;R; cg is positively assortative if
shareholders with high-revenue projects are matched with e¢ cient managers, i.e., Ri > Ri0
implies that cj  cj0, where (si) = mj and (si0) = mj0.
Proposition 7 shows that stable outcomes do indeed always involve positively assorta-
tive matchings if all the rms nd it optimal to use the same type of contract.
Proposition 7 If (;W) is a stable outcome for the market fS;M;R; cg, then  is
positively assortative if the contracts in W are all IS contracts, or they are all CBP
contracts.
If, for instance, all participants hire managers through CBP contracts, then a nega-
tively assortative contract could not be stable. The rationale is based on the fact that,
for any given vector of managers utilities, total prots are maximized when the best
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managers run the best projects. Therefore, any negative assortative matching would be
blocked by at least one alternative shareholder-manager partnership that created more
value for them.
However, the matching is not necessarily positively assortative when both types of
contracts coexist. In that case, how does a non-positively assortative matching in a stable
outcome look like? Proposition 8 describes such cases.
Proposition 8 If (;W) is a stable outcome for the market fS;M;R; cg and if (si) =
mj and (si0) = mj0 with Ri > Ri0 and cj > cj0, then si and mj sign a CBP contract while
si0 and mj0 sign an IS contract.
Therefore, in a non-positively assortative matching in a stable outcome, shareholders
with protable projects hire low-ability managers through CBPs while high-ability man-
agers sign incentive contracts in less protable rms. Notice that the complementarity
between shareholders project and managers e¢ ciency implies that total output is higher
when the matching is positively assortative. However, shareholders do not maximize total
output but prots. Also, the better the shareholder, the more likely that she prefers to
propose a CBP contract. Therefore, it may be that, shareholder s2s best contract to
attract manager m1 is an IS contract, giving him a utility not lower than bU21, while a
shareholder with a more protable project, s1, would prefer to hire this manager through
a CBP. If s1 is forced to pay m1 the utility that s2 is ready to o¤er, then she would rather
attract a less e¢ cient manager through a CBP, as long as the di¤erence in e¢ ciency
between the two managers and in the value of the two projects is not too large.14
To illustrate the type of equilibria that can arise, let us consider the following numerical
example. There are two shareholders with projects of value R1 = 2 and R2 = 1; and
two managers, with cost parameters c1 = 10 and c2 = 11. The market conditions are
characterized by Sr =
p
2. Given the heterogeneity in both sides of the market, the set
of stable outcomes is not a singleton. We characterize the most favorable stable outcome
14Legros and Newman (2007) provide conditions under which a positive assortative matching is attained
(see also Legros and Newman, 2002). Complementarity in partners types is a condition required for a
positive assortative matching to arise. However, another condition needs to be satised: the willingness
to pay of the best shareholder to hire the best manager should increase with the value of the project.
This is not necessarily the case when there is a choice between di¤erent governance structures, namely
CBP or IS.
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for the shareholders. In this outcome, manager m2 can be hired at the cost of U while the
level of utility of m1 will be determined by the value of this manager for the shareholder
hiring m2.
Consider a positive assortative candidate outcome: (s1) = m1 and (s2) = m2.
Manager m1s utility U1(U) at this outcome is characterized by the maximum utility that
s2 is ready to o¤er to this manager to hire him instead of m2, that is, U1(U) is implicitly
dened by s2(Ws2;m2(U)) = s2 (Ws2;m1(U
1(U))). Given the two equilibriummanagers
utility levels, Figure 3 plots shareholder s1s prots when she hires m1 at a cost of U1(U)
(solid line) and her prots when she hires m2 at a cost of U (dotted line).
Figure 3: Shareholder s1s prots
According to Figure 3, the positive assortative matching  together with contracts
Ws1;m1(U
1(U)) and Ws2;m2(U) constitute a stable outcome for U 2 [0; Ua] [

U b; U c
 [
[U c; Umax]. In the rst interval, both contracts include CBPs, since managersutility levels
are low, while both are IS contracts in the interval [U c; Umax] ;where managers obtain
high utility levels.15 In the interval

U b; U c

, where the outside utility takes intermediate
values, shareholder s1 still uses CBPs, while s2 nds it optimal to give manager m2
incentives. Hence, both types of contract coexist in a market where the matching is
positively assortative. However, another type of stable outcome exists in the interval
15The jump in the rst interval happens at the outside utility level where s2 would start hiring m1
through an IS contract, so U1(U) jumps upwards and s1
 
Ws1;m1(U
1(U))

jumps downwards at this
level.
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 
Ua; U b

where shareholder s1 and manager m2 sign a contract including CBPs. In fact,
in this region of parameters, the non-positive assortative matching 0(s1) = m2 and
0(s2) = m1 with the contracts Ws1;m2(U) (a CBP contract) and Ws2;m1(U
10(U)) (an IS
contract) is indeed the shareholders best stable outcome, where U10(U) is lower than
U1(U), and it is characterized by shareholder s1s willingness to pay for m1, that is,
s1(Ws1;m2(U)) = s1 (Ws1;m1(U
10(U))).
5 Introducing Codes: Welfare Considerations
As we have stressed, CBPs are voluntary mechanisms; shareholders only adopt them if
they earn higher prots, given the managersutilities. Therefore, a welfare improvement,
that is, a higher sum of shareholdersexpected prots and managersexpected utilities,
is to be expected if shareholders choose to implement CBPs. However, this is not always
be the case due to three e¤ects. First, CBPs allow shareholders to save on incentive costs
when IS contracts lead to managersutility levels higher than their reservation utility.
Hence, they may be willing to adopt CBPs even if they are welfare decreasing. Second,
the introduction of Codes may have an e¤ect on the managersutility levels. Finally, it
may also have a deep e¤ect on the market structure, giving rise to a negative assortative
matching.
Given that the set of stable outcomes in this economy is not necessarily unique, in
general it is di¢ cult to derive a comparative statics analysis for welfare. Nonetheless,
we are still able to draw appealing welfare implications from analyzing particular market
conditions. Note that we do not discuss those environments that forecast low market
conditions (Sr  1) since rms operating in these environments will never adopt CBPs.
We start with the discussion of the welfare of a rm (si;mj) when the managers
reservation utility U j is kept xed, as a function of the governance mechanism:
SWCBPij =
2
2
R2i
cj
and SWISij =
8<:
3[V ar+2]
8
R2i
cj
if U j < bUij
Ri
q
2[V ar+2]Uj
cj
  U j if U j  bUij .
Consider rst the case when managers utility is large, i.e., U j  bUij. Then the
Code is only adopted when Sr >
p
3 (because Uij  bUij whenever Sr  p3) and, if
adopted (i.e., if U j < U

ij), it is always the case that SWCBPij > SWISij : The reason for
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this property is that the managers utility does not vary and the shareholders prots
increase. Second, if the managers utility is low (i.e., U j < bUij), then SWCBPij > SWISij if
and only if Sr >
p
3 : the shareholder increases prots in all markets where Sr > 1, but
the managers utility falls from bUij to U j. Introducing Codes is welfare improving only if
Sr >
p
3; where the increase in prots outweighs the fall in utility, while otherwise the
total welfare is reduced. Therefore, for a given partnership (si;mj) and utility U j, the
possibility of adopting a CBP is welfare improving if and only if the market condition
forecast is high, i.e., Sr >
p
3.16
The previous analysis shows the implications for welfare of the introduction of CBPs
in markets where there is no real interaction among shareholders, in the sense that the
decision any of them makes is not a¤ected by the others. This is the case, in particular, in
markets with many homogeneous managers, where any shareholder can always hire one
of them at a cost of U .
Proposition 9 When the market is composed by heterogeneous shareholders and homo-
geneous managers and N > n, the introduction of Codes improves welfare if and only if
Sr >
p
3.
In markets with few homogeneous managers, i.e., N  n, the set of stable outcomes
is not necessarily unique, see Proposition 6; each of them is characterized by the level
of managers utility U o. However, one convenient feature is that the interval of such
stable utility levels is the same when CBPs are possible and when only IS contracts
can be signed. This property allows us to formulate the following simple extension of the
previous proposition:
Proposition 10 Suppose that the market is composed of heterogeneous shareholders and
homogeneous managers and that N  n. Consider the stable outcome (;WIS) when only
IS contracts are allowed, and let U o be the level of managersutility that characterizes this
outcome. Let (;W) be the stable outcome (when CBPs are possible) that is characterized
by the same U o. Then, the total welfare under (;W) is higher than total welfare under
(;WIS) if and only if Sr > p3.17
16We say that Codes are welfare improving if their introduction can never decrease welfare and they
increase it whenever they are actually signed.
17Notice the one particular situation where the the set of stable outcomes is a singleton; hence Propo-
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In markets composed of homogeneous shareholders and heterogeneous managers, some
new e¤ects arise. As seen in Proposition 5, a stable outcome is characterized by the level
of shareholdersprots . When there are many shareholders, i.e., n > N , the prots
vanish to zero and no rm will sign a CBP contract; hence, its introduction has no e¤ect.
When the number of homogeneous shareholders is not larger than the number of
heterogeneous managers, i.e., n  N , we also face a problem of multiplicity of stable
outcomes. The added di¢ culty now is that the interval of stable prots levelsis di¤erent
when CBPs are introduced than when they are not: the boundaries of the interval are
higher when Codes can be o¤ered. Shareholders may earn more prots when they can
o¤er CBPs, sometimes by reducing managers utility. Therefore, the introduction of CBPs
a¤ects the utility not only of the managers hired by rms implementing CBPs, but also
of the rest of the managers. Given that a decrease in managers utility leads to a lower
e¤ort under an IS contract, this additional e¤ect is typically negative for welfare.
A nal e¤ect of the introduction of CBPs is that the matching may not longer be posi-
tively assortative if both types of contract coexist. This e¤ect is also typically detrimental
for welfare, since a higher output is obtained under a positively assortative matching.
Therefore, the introduction of CBPs is likely to worsen welfare in those environments
where market conditions forecasts are moderate (Sr 2 (1;p3]). On the other hand, in
environments where forecasts are high (Sr >
p
3), the introduction of CBPs is likely to
have positive e¤ects on welfare as long as it does not induce too many changes in the
structure of the market, either through drastic decreases in managerslevels of utility or
through changes in the equilibrium allocation of managers to rms.
6 Conclusion and Extensions
This paper has explored the way market conditions and competition a¤ects shareholders
willingness to adopt Codes of Best Practice. We have modeled a Code as a monitoring
mechanism that allows shareholders to control the managersdecisions ex-ante. Adopting
the Code, however, impedes the managersexible reaction to changing market conditions.
sition 10 can be written in the same terms as Proposition 9, is a market with at least N +1 shareholders,
where RN = RN+1. In this market, the level of Uo that characterizes the unique stable outcome is dened
as the level that makes shareholder Ns prots equal to zero.
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CBPs tend to be adopted in environments where predicting the market conditions is
not a complex task for shareholders. More mature industries, such as the utilities, banking
and food and drink sectors, should be, according to our predictions, examples of industries
where CBPs are more likely to be adopted. On the other hand, when the environment
faces high volatility, the best option for a shareholder is to leave the managers hands
free, i.e., to o¤er him an incentive contract. High-tech sectors such as dot-com industries
or pharmaceutical companies should tend to use incentive contracts, letting the manager
take the major decisions.
Our analysis may have implications regarding when rms will be more willing to adopt
CBPs. Indeed, market conditions vary depending, for instance, on macroeconomic con-
ditions or business cycles. As we have mentioned, the choice of the governance structure
takes into account the expected market conditions, measured through the Sharpe ratio.
CBPs are more likely to be adopted after recessions, when expected market conditions
tend to improve, whereas contracts based on incentives should be expected during (or at
the end of) booms where forecasts for market conditions tend to worsen.
Our ndings suggest that the characteristics of the set of shareholders and the set of
managers in the market have deep e¤ects on the decision of whether to adopt a CBP.
When the shareholders have similar projects, i.e., the rmstechnologies are similar, then
CBPs do not seem to be the right mechanisms to attract the best managers. Indeed,
when both types of governance structures coexist, the lower the managers ability, the
more likely that a Code is adopted. Instead, when managers are of similar ability, the
shareholders with the best projects prefer to adopt the Code to reduce managers rents.
In fact, our analysis suggests that the best shareholders might be willing to renounce
hiring the best managers, who would be o¤ered incentive contracts, and hire instead lower
ability managers through CBPs. Hence, although the matching between shareholders and
managers is always positively assortative when only one type of governance structure exists
in the market, the property may fail to hold due to the coexistence of both governance
structures.
Since the characteristics of the market are linked to the type of industry a rm operates
in and to the type of project it conducts, it seems natural to ask how the conclusions of
our analysis would be a¤ected if shareholdersheterogeneity was not due to the value of
their project but to the distribution function of the market-specic characteristics (that
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is, we would have a distribution function Fi(h) for each shareholder si). Also in this
case, matching is positively assortativewhen all rms end up under the same type of
governance structure. However, the meaning of positively assortativedepends now on
the type of governance. If all contracts include a Code, then the best managers are hired
by those shareholders whose market-specic component has a higher mean. However, if
they are all incentive contracts, the bestshareholders are those in markets where the
combination of mean and variance (expressed in the variable V ar + 2) is higher; these
are the shareholders who end up forming rms with the higher-ability managers. Also,
we have some information about what a non-positively assortative matching in a stable
outcome looks like. For example, if all shareholders own projects in markets whose shocks
have the same average, then in a non-positively assortative matching, shareholders in
markets with higher volatility hire low-ability managers through incentive contracts while
high-ability managers sign contracts including a Code in rms producing in markets with
lower variance.
Finally, we have not considered the possibility that rms, once created, could compete
against each other in the product market. In our model, there was competition among
shareholders to catch the best managers and among managers to get the best contracts,
but there was no competition among rms. A rms prots were independent of the
composition of the other rms. Extending our model to explicitly allow rmsmarket
competition seems computationally demanding. However, the analysis developed so far
provides enough elements to be able to anticipate the e¤ects of rmscompetition on the
use of Codes of Best Practices.
For our purposes, market competition among rms should have two main implications.
First, it makes the best managers even more appealing than before as shareholders will
be ready to o¤er good salaries to them not only because of their value for the rm but
also to prevent them from hired by the market competitors. According to our results,
such an increase in managersutility should favor the use of incentive contracts. Second,
market competition typically allows the improvement of incentive contracts by making
use of yardstick contracts, where a manager is paid not only according to his absolute
performance, but also as a function of his relative performance with respect to others.
Both e¤ects act to make incentive contracts more appealing. Therefore, we should expect
to observe less use of Codes in those markets characterized by tough competition.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that (;W) is stable. (a) If there exists a feasi-
ble W 0 for (si;mj = (si)) such that si(mj;W
0)  si(mj;Wsi;mj) and Vmj(si;W 0) =
Vmj(si;Wmj ;si), then consider the contract W
00 that includes both salaries higher thanW 0
by  > 0. The managerse¤orts are the same under W 00 and W 0 (if they include a CBP,
this will happen by contract; if they are IS contracts, the ICC does not change). If 
is small enough, then si(mj;W
00) > si(mj;Wsi;mj) and Vmj(si;W
00) > Vmj(si;Wmj ;si);
which would contradict the stability of (;W).
(b) If there exists a feasible W 0 for (si;mj) including a CBP such that si(mj;W
0) =
si(mj;Wsi;mj) and Vmj(si;W
0) > Vmj(si;Wmj ;si), then the contractW
00 with both salaries
lower that W 0 by a small enough  > 0 satises si(mj;W
00) > si(mj;Wsi;mj) and
Vmj(si;W
00) > Vmj(si;Wmj ;si). If W
0 is an IS contract, then the proof requires properties
that we study later on. In Proposition 2, we characterize the set of optimal contracts for
a shareholder under the (weak inequality) constraint that her manager obtains a certain
level of utility; that is, we only use the optimality property that we have just shown in (a).
The set of feasible utility-prots pairs that can be achieved under IS contracts satises
two properties: there is only one contract that achieves the highest level of shareholders
prots (where mj obtains the utility level that we will denote bUij) and the frontier of
utility-prots pairs is strictly decreasing from that point on. Therefore, if there exists W 0
providing higher utility for mj than Wmj ;si, it is necessarily the case that Wmj ;si provides
si with a level of prots lower than the maximum level, and thus it does not lie in the
Pareto frontier. Hence, there also exists W 00 that strictly improves both shareholder sis
prots and manager mjs utility, which would contradict the stability of (;W).
Proof of Proposition 2. The contract W ISsi;mj(U j) is the solution to the program
max
fwRi;j ;w0i;j ;ei;jg
hZ
h

hei;j(w
R
i;j; w
0
i;j;h)

Ri   wRi;j
  1  hei;j(wRi;j; w0i;j;h)w0	 dF (h)
s.t. (ICC),(LLR), (LL0), and
hZ
h
(
hei;j(w
R
i;j; w
0
i;j;h)w
R
i;j +

1  hei;j(wRi;j; w0i;j;h)

w0i;j   cj
ei;j(w
R
i;j; w
0
i;j;h)
2
2
)
dF (h)  U j:
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We can rewrite the programme by plugging (ICC) into the objective function and the
last constraint and set   V ar + 2. After some calculations, we obtain
max
fwRi;j ;w0i;jg

 w0i;j +

cj
(wRi;j   w0i;j)(Ri   (wRi;j   w0i;j))

s.t. w0i;j +

2cj
(wRi;j   w0i;j)2  U j (1)
w0i;j  0: (2)
where we have omitted (LLR) since it is implied by (ICC) and (2).
Let  and  be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to (1) and (2), respectively.
The Kuhn-Tucker (rst-order) conditions of the above maximization problem are (1), (2),
  0,   0, and

cj
(Ri   2(wRi;j   w0i;j)) + 

cj
(wRi;j   w0i;j) = 0 (3)
 1  
cj
(Ri   2(wRi;j   w0i;j)) +   

cj
(wRi;j   w0i;j) +  = 0 (4)


w0i;j +

2cj
(wRi;j   w0i;j)2   U j

= 0 (5)
w0i;j = 0:
First, simplifying (3) we get
 = 2  Ri
(wRi;j   w0i;j)
(6)
and plugging (6) into (4) we obtain
 =  1 + Ri
(wRi;j   w0i;j)
: (7)
We study the di¤erent regions where the Kuhn-Tucker conditions may be satised:
Case 1:  > 0,  > 0 (Both (1) and (2) are binding). The payment in case of failure is
w0i;j = 0 following (1) while in case of success it is w
R
i;j =
q
2Ujcj

from (2). Finally, from
(6) and (7),  > 0 and  > 0 are possible only if U j 2

R2i
cj

8
;
R2i
cj

2

:
Case 2:  =  = 0. (3) implies Ri = 2(wRi;j   w0i;j) and plugging this into (4) we get
 1 = 0, which is not possible.
Case 3:  > 0;  = 0 ((1) is binding). From (7) we get wRi;j   w0i;j = Ri. This implies
that  = 1. Then, (1) implies w0 = U j   R
2
i
cj

2
. Since w0  0, this case is only possible if
U j  R
2
i
cj

2
.
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Case 4:  = 0;  > 0 ((2) is binding). From (2) we obtain w0 = 0, and using (6), we
get wR = Ri2 . This implies, by (7),  = 1. In this case (1) holds only if U j 
R2i
cj

8
.
If U j >
R2i
cj

2
, the optimum must lie in Case 3 and si =  w0i;j < 0, which is not
feasible. If U j <
R2i
cj

8
, the optimum lies in Case 4, where Uj =
R2i
cj

8
and the shareholders
prots are the same as if U j =
R2i
cj

8
. These facts prove part (a) in Proposition 2.
Also, it is easily checked that the solution at the borders of Cases 3 and 4 coincide
with the solution at the borders of Case 1 (the solution is continuous). Therefore, the
optimal contract has the shape found in Case 1, which proves part (b). Finally, parts (c)
and (d) follow from the contracts in Case 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, a xed wage is optimal, we denote it by wi;j
(= wRi;j = w
0
i;j). The contract W
CBP
si;mj
(U j) is the solution to the program
max
fe;wi;jg
hZ
h
heRidF (h)  wi;j = eRi   wi;j
s.t. wi;j   cj e
2
2
 U j (8)
wi;j  0: (9)
From (8), we get wi;j  cj e22 + U j,which implies that (9) is not binding. Also, since wi;j
negatively a¤ects shareholder sis expected prots, (8) is binding. This proves part (c) of
Proposition 3. Therefore, the shareholders problem is
eCBPi;j 2 argmax
ei;j
feRi   cj e
2
2
g;
hence, eCBPi;j =
Ri
cj
. This shows part (a). Part (b) is obtained by plugging eCBPi;j into
(8) binding. Finally, to prove part (d), we substitute eCBPi;j and the optimal wage into
shareholder sis expected prots.
Proof of Proposition 4. We compare the prot functions of propositions 2 and
3. First, we compare both prot functions at the extreme values U j = 0 and eUij:
si(W
CBP
si;mj
(0))  si(W ISsi;mj(0))()
R2i
cj
2
2
 R
2
i
cj
[V ar + 2]
4
() V ar  2.
si(W
CBP
si;mj
(eUij)) = R2i
cj
2
2
  R
2
i
cj
[V ar + 2]
2
< 0 = si(W
IS
si;mj
(eUij)),
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Moreover,
@

si (W
CBP
si;mj
(Uj))

@Uj
=  1, @

si (W
IS
si;mj
(Uj))

@Uj
= 0 for U j  bUij; and si(W ISsi;mj(U j))
is a decreasing and concave function of U j for U j 2
hbUij; eUiji with @si (W ISsi;mj (Uj))@Uj =
0 for U j = bUij and @si (W ISsi;mj (Uj))@Uj =  1 for U j = eUij. Therefore, the functions
si(W
CBP
si;mj
(U j)) and si(W
IS
si;mj
(U j)) cross at most once in
h
0; eUiji :
The previous properties imply, rst of all, that si(W
CBP
si;mj
(U j))  si(W ISsi;mj(U j))
for all U j if V ar  2: Second, si(W ISsi;mj(U j)) =
R2i
cj
[V ar+2]
4
for all U j  bUij and
si(W
CBP
si;mj
(U j)) is strictly decreasing w.r.t. U j. We evaluate the prots at bUij and obtain
si(W
CBP
si;mj
(bUij))  si(W ISsi;mj(bUij))() R2icj 
2
2
  R
2
i
cj
[V ar + 2]
8
 R
2
i
cj
[V ar + 2]
4
() 2  3
4

V ar + 2
() V ar  1
3
2:
Therefore, if Sr 2 1;p3 the Code is adopted if and only if U j < Uij, where Uij 2 h0; bUiji
is dened by si(W
CBP
si;mj
(Uij)) = si(W
IS
si;mj
(Uij)), i.e., U

ij =
R2i
2cj
h
2 V ar
2
i
:
Finally, if Sr  p3; then si(WCBPsi;mj (bUij)) > si(W ISsi;mj(bUij)) and si(WCBPsi;mj (eUij)) <
si(W
IS
si;mj
(eUij)): By the properties of the derivatives of the prot functions, there exists a
unique Uij 2 (bUij; eUij) such that the Code is adopted if U j < Uij. Level Uij is the smallest
of the two values for which si(W
CBP
si;mj
(Uij)) = si(W
IS
si;mj
(Uij)), i.e., Ri
q
2[V ar+2]Uij
cj
 
2Uij =
R2i
cj
2
2
  Uij. It corresponds to the expression stated in the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5. Part (a) is necessary: if shareholder s1 would obtain lower
prots than s2, then she could hire (s2) by o¤ering him a slightly better utility level than
before and make strictly higher prots. Part (b) easily follows from the maximum and
minimum prots that the shareholder hiring the worst manager (or not hiring at all) can
make. Part (c) follows after Proposition 1. Finally, it is immediate that if the contracts
satisfy (a) - (c), then the outcome is stable.
To prove part (d1), we note that if Sr  1, the CBP is never adopted according to
Proposition 4. If Sr > 1 and   n, then   j for all mj, since j is decreasing
in j. This implies that Uj  Uj , since the constrained Pareto optimal contract between
the shareholder and mj that provides her a prot level smaller or equal than j shall
give mj higher utility level than Uj (which he would obtain if the shareholder would get
j). Therefore (Proposition 4), an incentive contract is optimal for all j. A very similar
argument allows us to prove (d2 ). When Sr > 1 and J is such that J   > J+1
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then J   if and only if j  J . As we have argued above, j   implies that the
constrained Pareto optimal contract between a shareholder and mj is an IS contract. In
fact, Ws;mj is a IS contract if and only if j  J , as stated in part (d3 ) of the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 6. When ~n < N , any shareholder only needs to o¤er
U o = U to attract a manager. When ~n = N < n, the possibility that the best unmatched
shareholder, s~n+1, hires a manager, implies that the minimum utility U o cannot be lower
than the level that makes this shareholder not willing to form a rm, i.e., eU~n+1;m. Finally,
the level U o cannot be higher than eU~n;m so that s~n is still interested in forming a rm. It is
then immediate that any contract in a stable outcome should be the best contract for the
shareholder when she only needs to o¤er U o to any manager. Also, given the homogeneity
of the managers, all stable outcomes are characterized by a common minimum utility U o.
Parts (c1), (c2), and (c3) easily follow given the characteristics of the optimal contract
given in Proposition 4 and the fact that U1 > ::: > U

I 1 > U

I > ::: > U

~n.
Proof of Propositions 7 and 8. As in the Proof of Proposition 2, let us denote
  V ar + 2. The proof is by contradiction. Take two matched shareholders si and si0,
with mj = (si) and mj0 = (si0), such that Ri > Ri0 while cj > cj0 : Denote by Uj and
Uj0, the level of utility obtained by managers mj and mj0 in the stable outcome (;W).
It is easy to check that cj > cj0 implies Uj < Uj0 : The contracts signed by shareholders si
and si0 are, respectively, Wsi;mj(Uj) and Wsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0).
We are going to prove that unless Wsi;mj(Uj) = W
CBP
si;mj
(Uj) and Wsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0) =
W ISsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0); the following inequality holds:
si(Wsi;mj0 (Uj0)) + si0 (Wsi0 ;mj(Uj)) > si(Wsi;mj(Uj)) + si0 (Wsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0)): (10)
Therefore, either si(Wsi;mj0 (Uj0)) > si(Wsi;mj(Uj)) or si0 (Wsi0 ;mj(Uj)) > si0 (Wsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0)).
However, this cannot happen in a stable outcome. Indeed, suppose for instance that the
rst inequality was true. Shareholder si could o¤er tomj0 a contract that would guarantee
him an expected utility slightly larger than Uj0 while keeping for herself expected prots
larger than si(Wsi;mj(Uj)). That is, the partnership (si;mj0) could block the outcome
(;W).
We now prove inequality (10).
(a) Consider rst that both are IS contracts: Wsi;mj(Uj) =W
IS
si;mj
(Uj) andWsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0) =
W ISsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0): From Proposition (2), the optimal payment has a di¤erent shape depending
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on the level of utility. We know that Uj  bUij and Uj0  bUi0j0. This also implies that
Uj  bUi0j: We now consider two cases:
(a1) Uj0  bUij0. In this case, the equation (10) is equivalent to
Ri
s
2Uj0
cj0
  2Uj0 +Ri0
s
2Uj
cj
  2Uj > Ri
s
2Uj
cj
  2Uj +Ri0
s
2Uj0
cj0
  2Uj0,
which holds given that
[Ri  Ri0 ]
"s
Uj0
cj0
 
s
Uj
cj
#
> 0:
(a2) Uj0 2 [bUi0j0 ; bUij0). In this case, si(W Isi;mj0 (bUij0)) = R2i 4cj0 and (10) is implied by
R2i 
4cj0
+Ri0
s
2Uj
cj
  2Uj > Ri
s
2Uj
cj
  2Uj +Ri0
s
2Uj0
cj0
  2Uj0 ;
which is equivalent to
f(Ri; Ri0) =
R2i 
4cj0
 
 
Ri0
s
2Uj0
cj0
  2Uj0
!
  (Ri  Ri0)
s
2Uj
cj
> 0:
We see that @f(Ri;Ri0 )
@Ri
> 0 i¤ Uj < bUij0 cjcj0 , which always holds in this region. Then,
f(Ri; Ri0) > f(Ri0 ; Ri0) for any Ri > Ri0 ; and (10) holds if g(Uj0)  f(Ri0 ; Ri0) = R
2
i0
4cj0
 
Ri0
q
2Uj0
cj0
  2Uj0

 0. It is easy to check that g(Uj0) is increasing when Uj0 > bUi0j0,
having its minimum at Uj0 = bUi0j0 where g(bUij0) = 0. Therefore, (10) holds.
(b) Suppose that all stable contracts include a CBP: Equation (10) is implied by:
R2i
2
2cj0
  Uj0 + R
2
i0
2
2cj
  Uj > R
2
i
2
2cj
  Uj + R
2
i0
2
2cj0
  Uj0 ()

R2i  R2i0
  1
cj0
  1
cj

> 0;
which always holds.
(c) We now consider that the existing contracts areW ISsi;mj(Uj) andW
CBP
si0 ;mj0
(Uj0). We show
that they can not be part of a stable outcome if and only
si0 (W
IS
si0 ;mj
(Uj)) + si(W
CBP
si;mj0
(Uj0)) > si(W
IS
si;mj
(Uj)) + si0 (W
CBP
si0 ;mj0
(Uj0)) (11)
since either (si0 ;mj) or (si;mj0) can do better than under the original contracts. Given
that Uj is the level of utility obtained by mj; and (si;mj) sign an IS contract, it is
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necessarily the case that Uj  bUij. Also, Ri > Ri0 implies that Uj  bUi0j. Therefore, we
can rewrite (11) as:
Ri0
s
2Uj
cj
  2Uj + R
2
i
2
2cj0
  Uj0 > Ri
s
2Uj
cj
  2Uj + R
2
i0
2
2cj0
  Uj0 ;
i.e.,
Uj <

Ri +Ri0
2
2
[2]
2
2
cj
c2j0
: (12)
For the contractWCBPsi0 ;mj0 (Uj0) to be optimal, it is necessarily the case (according to Propo-
sition 4) that Uj0  Ui0j0 : Since Uj < Uj0, Uj < Ui0j0. Therefore, equation (12) certainly
holds if Ui0j0 is lower or equal than the right-hand side of (12). We claim that this is the
case. Indeed, when Sr  p3,
Ui0j0 =
R2i0
cj0
hp
  p   2
i2
2


Ri +Ri0
2
2
[2]
2
2
cj
c2j0
()"
  pp   2
2
#2


Ri +Ri0
2Ri0
2
cj
cj0
:
While the right-hand side of the last equation is always larger than 1; given that Ri > Ri0
and cj > cj0, the left-hand side is smaller or equal than 1 if and only if

2
 
r

2
r

2
  1  1() 
2
  1 
r

2
r

2
  1()r

2
  1 
r

2
which always holds. When Sr 2 (1;p3), the claim is equivalent to
R2i0
2cj0

2   
2



Ri +Ri0
2
2
[2]
2
2
cj
c2j0
() 
2
  1
2


2
2


Ri +Ri0
2Ri0
2
cj
cj0
:
The left-hand side of the equation is always lower than 1. Hence, equation (11) holds and
the initial contracts can not be part of a stable outcome.
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